Sideshow by William Shawcross

 

When we consider Nixon, Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia, Sideshow by William Shawcross is probably the main event, if not the last word. On completing the book, it’s hard to imagine that the author has left a single document on the subject untouched, a single actor in the saga un-researched. The level of detail here is forensic, to such an extent, perhaps, that the actors in the story never really develop character, because they are always too busy, apparently, acting out their explicit roles.

Perhaps, it’s easier at the start to say what Sideshow is not, so that its focus can become quite clear. Sideshow is not about the Vietnam War, though of course this almost continually figures, sometimes over the border, sometimes just this side of it. Sideshow is also not a description of the Khmer Rouge government, its attempted genocide or its atrocities, though of course it and its actions do figure large in the final chapters of the book, after it took power following the collapse of the American-backed regime, if this is not an oxymoron.

What Sideshow does describe is US policy towards Cambodia from the late 1960s, its effects on Cambodian society, its attempted manipulation of Cambodian politics and the rationale, if that be a relevant term, that underpinned the involvement. The utter confusion that is described is perhaps best illustrated by the sequence of the start of the book where the first B-52 raids on targets within Cambodia are described. Not only were these missions secret, but it seems that even the aircrew flying them did not know beforehand where they were going, and in the first instance the radio operator aboard acknowledged mission complete still ignorant of his position. In addition, all logs relating to the completion of the tasks were falsified in an attempt to hide from the rest of the world the location of the dropped bombs. Not bad for a start.

A theme in Sideshow is just how thoroughly random the process of making policy was in Washington at the end of the 1960s. You have powerful personalities using platforms to promote themselves and themselves only. You have influential actors more influenced by Hollywood‘s vision of reality than anything they experienced, either via reality or by informed briefing. Somehow the world was always wrong if it did not conform to how it should be. A quote endures relating to how democracy should prevail as a ubiquitous goal alongside how people should not be allowed to be so stupid as to elect socialists, as in Chile.

An instructive and memorable passage describes the Huston Plan, which sanctioned the wire-tapping, mail-meddling and general surveillance of anyone deemed of interest, which included anyone who wanted to question what turned out to be a fallacious orthodoxy. William Shawcross writes: “Nixon approved the plan… (whose) …discovery in 1973 helped enormously to build such Congressional outrage that the legislature was finally able to force the White House to end the massive bombing of Cambodia, which was just beginning to spread as Huston formulated his proposals in summer 1970. It was to become a crucial part of the impeachment proceedings. When, much later, Nixon was asked by David Frost to justify his actions he bluntly produced a new version of presidential infallibility – ‘Well, when the president does it, that makes it not illegal’.” Which just goes to show that other, more recent incumbents were not actually responsible for inventing the concept of infallibility.

And in another passage relating to a different set of events, William Shawcross quotes Senator William J Fulbright saying, “I don’t think it is legal or constitutional. But whether it is right or not, he has done it. He has the power to do it because under our system there is not an easy way to stop him”. Some things, it seems, do not change, no matter how pressing proves the need, nor how many decades have passed in the meantime.

A long way before the end of the book, an ending we now know to have unfolded, the descent into chaos for Cambodia seemed inevitable. It is a small nation and like a thorn in the foot of an elephant, it was toyed with, scraped, pulled out and discarded. The elephant moved on and the thorn was apparently left to its own devices, eventually to prick itself.

Vietnam – A History by Stanley Karnow

At around 270,000 words, Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam – A History is something of a monster, as is its subject. Even those who did not live through the era when reports of the conflict dominated most international news, the title itself is still probably recognised as something iconic, something that sums up the third quarter of the twentieth century. The word iconic would be inaccurate, however. Icons are small images that suggest something bigger.

Vietnam, as a subject, as a reality, was always a big issue. It was fought over for thirty years, toppled US Presidents, claimed untold thousands of lives and effectively involved the whole world. This was superpower conflict by proxy. Stanley Karnow’s book is replete with detail, analysis, fact, some fiction and much posturing. It benefits from being written largely from experience. The author was a respected journalist who covered the war at its height and his encounters with political elites, combatants and victims bring the story of death and destruction to life, if that phrase is not in bad taste. This was no minor skirmish, confined to a far corner of the North American world view. World War Two devastated Europe and significant other parts of the world. And yet a greater tonnage of explosives was dropped in the Vietnam War than in all the Second World War’s theatres of conflict combined. It’s worth taking a moment to reflect on that.

In addition, chemical weapons, defoliants and napalm were sprayed around with apparent abandon before the United States, defeated, left for their territorially unaffected, unattacked home. There are those who thought the war was counter-productive. There were those who still think that the war was fought by a USA that had one hand tied behind its back. An all-out onslaught would have brought decisive victory. But, given the above, what would that victory have looked like? Just how close did the world come to a second nuclear war? Stanley Karnow reminds us how truth becomes a casualty.

He describes how US officials, civilian and military alike dared not communicate negative messages or attitudes about the war. To do so was seen as defeatism and there were no promotions for defeatists, no opportunities for pessimists, their positions being interpreted as merely unpatriotic. In contrast, positive reports were rewarded, even if they bore little resemblance to reality. And the author’s portrait of Walt Rostow, a prominent member of LBJ’s team, casts him squarely in the role of anti-communist hawk, a guise in which we should view him when today we approach his still respected work on economic change and development.

But what is perhaps most troubling was the ease with which those in power used the mechanisms of their state to hound dissenters, to tap their phones, block their careers. And, it has to be remembered, this culture did lead – though perhaps indirectly – to the near impeachment and actual removal from office of an elected US President. Stanley Karnow’s book captures the conflict ideologically, historically and politically. Alongside Gabriel Kolko’s book on the same subject, it ought to be required reading for anyone left in the world who thinks that war can solve conflict.